Lest we forget, there is a war going on. The Afghanis are, like the Guinea people, some of the poorest on earth. They were promised, by Bin Laden, that they could dismember the US empire if they believed in Allah’s will and follow his instructions which is to resist US domination like they did, Russian domination. This strategy is working. Look at the stock market today: down into the pits of hell. Financial destruction stares us in the face, yet we are doubling our war with the Taliban who can see the wreck and ruin of the US very clearly. ‘Allah is great’, they chant as we send killer robots after them.
Here is a declassified NATO document which I see is marked for “Official Use” only. Should I have this? Well, I do. (Sorry NATO!)
Anyhow, this document explains how they will fight the war in Afghanistan.
I notice the USA wants to withdraw from Iraq, where the war is easy to win, and they are focussing more on the war in Afghanistan, where it is more remote, and much more difficult to win!
19. The ISAF Theatre StratCom Strategy is meant to be dynamic and evolutionary. We
are fighting a multifaceted counter-insurgency within a complex context without the benefit
of an established coalition doctrine or policy. To be successful we must seize and
maintain the initiative in StratCom. We must understand the operating environment, be
agile and versatile to respond rapidly, and have the foresight and agility to adapt faster and
with greater effect than our adversaries.
14. Roles and Responsibilities. Roles and responsibilities of ISAF StratCom operators,
key supporting staff and select NATO StratCom operators follow:
a. COM ISAF. Key StratCom messenger. COM sets the objectives and priorities for
ISAF StratCom. Chairs the ISAF StratCom Executive Group, approving ISAF
StratCom target audiences, supporting effects and enduring StratCom themes and
b. DCOM ISAF. Director of Strategic Communications for ISAF. Runs the ISAF
StratCom Executive Group on behalf of the COM chairing it in his absence. DCOM
manages the priorities for and actions of ISAF StratCom, provides direction and
guidance for rapidly evolving situations, approving new shorter-term StratCom
themes and messages as required .
c. COS. Overall responsibility for the coordination of ISAF staff effort to support
StratCom objectives and activities. Responsible for ISAF staff structure and
procedures; proposes and coordinates revision as required or as directed by COM
ISAF. Approves release of StratCom direction and guidance. Assists in
coordination with subordinate commands.
d. DCOS Ops. Overall responsible for synchronization of effects and actions, kinetic
and non-kinetic. Approves release of all plans, orders, and FRAGOs. Ensures
INFO OPS coordinates related disciplines and activities for all operations.
e. ISAF Spokesperson. Represents ISAF with the media and consults with the
NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), GIRoA, UNAMA, IC and media
agencies in accordance with SACEUR approved Terms of Reference.
f. Strategic Advisory Group. On behalf of COM ISAF develops the ISAF Theater
StratCom Strategy, assists ICB with ISAF StratCom Executive Group, and helps
communicate COM / DCOM priorities and guidance through attendance at
StratCom meetings and input to select StratCom related products.
g. Information Coordination Branch (ICB). Develops ISAF StratCom themes and
messages. Maintains the ISAF StratCom Effects Matrix. Coordinates the execution
of the StratCom strategy with ISAF StratCom operators. Ensures StratCom input to
OPLANs, Orders and FRAGOs is incorporated in INFO OPS input. Leads on
StratCom coordination with NATO higher headquarters, and with external StratCom
partners (GIRoA, UNAMA, IC) in Afghanistan, supported by other ISAF StratCom
operators as appropriate. Leads on evaluating the impact of ISAF StratCom
h. Public Affairs (PA) Branch. Coordinates and synchronizes media activity and
engagement in line with the StratCom strategy within ISAF, with NATO higher
headquarters, and with external PA partners and media agencies in Afghanistan.
Develops ISAF Media Master Narrative in concert with NATO HQ. Assists in the
development of GIRoA PA capability. Reports on media engagements and
provides media monitoring and analysis to support the planning and targeting of
StratCom activity and evaluation of the StratCom strategy.
i. Information Operations (INFO OPS) Branch. Leads on the coordination and
synchronization of all INFO OPS activities within ISAF AOO. In conjunction with
other ISAF StratCom operators coordinates the development of INFO OPS input
(including RC level Themes and Messages) to OPLANS, Orders and FRAGOs in
support of ISAF operations. Leads on the planning, coordination, execution and
reporting of Key Leader Engagement. Monitors and assesses the impact of INFO
OPS activities to support evaluation of the overall StratCom strategy.
j. CJPOTF. Plans, coordinates, executes, synchronizes and reports on Psychological
Operations within Afghanistan and the Afghan neighbourhood as a part of wider
INFO OPS activity and in support of the ISAF StratCom strategy. Provides analysis
of PSYOPS and StratCom target audiences (Afghan national, Afghan
neighbourhood and INS audiences) and effects to support planning and evaluation
across the information domain as a whole.
k. CJ2. Provides threat analysis, recommends INS vulnerabilities for exploitation, and
supports CJPOTF assessment of Afghan and Pakistan attitudes.
l. CJ3. Ensures that ICB is aware of emerging StratCom threats and opportunities
and that information domain activity is incorporated within broader operational
m. CJ5. Ensures that StratCom input is incorporated within ISAF OPLANS and
provides requests to ICB for StratCom support to planning.
n. OAB. In coordination with offices designated with responsibility for effect
assessment, provides analytical support and assists in development of related
Measures of Effectiveness.
o. POLAD. Provides political analysis to ICB to assist in the identification and conduct
of suitable information domain activities supporting and reporting on the impact of
political and diplomatic key leader engagement.
p. NATO SCR. Represents NATO Secretary General with IRoA authorities,
International Community principals, International Organizations and the diplomatic
q. NATO Spokesperson. Represents NATO with the media, coordinates with GIRoA,
UNAMA, IC and media agencies. As part of the NATO SCR’s office has an
important role within ISAF StratCom to facilitate rapid co-ordination with NATO HQ
and to engage with the media in and out of theatre. Close co-operation, especially
with Chief PAO and ISAF Spokesperson and as part of the StratCom Executive
Group, is expected to ensure unity and amplification of messaging.
This document outlines how the US plans to win the PROPAGANDA war with the Taliban. The writers all think that they have it in the bag: the Taliban have no global TV, no major newspapers, not outlets in the world at all. All they have are three things:
- prayers to Allah
- word of mouth
- the internet
The NATO allies have most of the planetary information sharing systems. But like all things evil, this is balanced by the slender, feeble resources of the Afghanis. They only have their God on their side. We have demons of greed, imperial power and the desire to kill so we can live like Kings.
As usual, the gods side with those who struggle to overturn empires. All empires have to beware of ‘barbarian wars’ where there are little rewards and lots of hazards. The US/NATO propaganda operation in the West was a complete success. There was sufficient talk of victory to convince a slender majority to increase the war against the poorest people on earth.
The lure of winning a grand prize of some sort has snagged enough popular support for our bankrupt empire to go even more bankrupt. Since no one from the top to the bottom of our government, is questioning the strategy and goals of this ruinous war, we get nothing but epic pushes to convince us, continuing this war will end in victory.
This is the problem with all war propaganda: it works only on populations controlled by the propagandists. They have been hopelessly beaten by the Afghani rebels whose propaganda techniques, though often rather crude [they kill just like we do] still works for one main reason: they are believable.
The US propaganda is not believable. Americans love Victory and always want to win. But sometimes, retreat is smarter. If we insist on winning, no matter how wise, we will be drawn into deadly traps like WWI was for the British and German empires. Shooting until you run out of bullets is a bad strategy. Shooting yourself in the foot is even dumber.
The successful propaganda campaign against the American people was a success. This merely pushes forwards the defeat of America as a world power. This is why we cannot let the military have their own way. Why we have to question them about everything. Why we have to pressure the Democrats to stop this stupid, futile, dangerous war against the Afghani people. I don’t care how often the Pentagon claims victory. We lost the war. We lost our economy. We lost our souls.
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